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In recent years, the subject of collective memory has received much attention as scholars and practitioners affiliated with ethnography, oral history and related social science methodologies struggle to articulate the social, historical and political mechanisms that privilege certain memories and ways of remembering over others.
1 Within the resulting body of literature, collective memory-also referenced as dominant, national, official, or public memory-is frequently approached as 'a formidable coercive process that induces the individual memory to coalesce with the dominant one' (Ryan, 2010 : 159, referencing Thomson, 1994 ).
Yet scratching the surface of this literature reveals criticisms that draw upon empirical and anecdotal evidence in support of the realization that at the individual level, the reception and internalization of collective memory is far from simple or uniform. For example, Lorainne Ryan (2010: 159) argues that '[t] he analysis of collective memory purely in terms of elites and hegemony mistakenly neglects the reception of the official memory.' Her investigation of mnemonic resistance-individual or community acts of resistance to a collective memory narrative-reveals that while some individuals may adopt a narrative in the manner envisaged by political elites, for example, other 3 individuals will adapt the narrative to better mesh with their lived experiences and perspectives. Still others will reject the collective narrative outright. Similarly, Laura
Basu's analysis of present-day remembrance of Australian outlaw and national hero, Ned
Kelly, reveals how mediation, temporality and power intermingle such that '[e]nduring cultural memories are never made by politicians, monuments or individual media representations alone' but are instead 'formed and develop through a tangle of relations that reaches back and forth across time' to directly affect national identity formation on an individual level (2011: 33) . Likewise, Farhat Shahzad's study of how Canadian youth construct collective memories surrounding the War on Terror offers similar insights.
Shahzad finds collective memories are 'more dynamic, multiple, shared and contested in their nature' than previously articulated in the literature, and that members of a community can simultaneously be invested in multiple versions of an event according to the agency of the narrator, the material technologies available to them, and the social networks in which they are embedded (2012: 379).
Given these recent critiques, an interrogation of collective memory as it relates to qualitative studies of mass atrocities and their aftermaths becomes crucial. In particular, scholars must be mindful about eliciting and reproducing dominant narratives that, while seemingly innocuous, are constructed in a manner that furthers political or ideological agendas, particularly those that might enhance divisions within a population, for example.
As a starting point, this article analyses 'iconic stories'-pervasive accounts that are internalized and recounted due to their personal and/or historical resonance for the narrator. This term was first introduced by Linda Shopes (2002: 9) , who used it to encapsulate 'concrete, specific accounts that "stand for" or sum up something the narrator reckons of particular historical importance' that are 'presented as unique or totemic events and are communicated with considerable emotional force.' To better express their personal importance, Sherna Berger Gluck (2013: 12) later expanded this term to include any 'anecdote that resonates so deeply that the narrator adopts it as her own.'
Iconic stories can pose certain challenges to the study of mass atrocities. To explore these challenges, the following discussion analyzes the deeper meaning of four iconic stories common to post-genocide Rwanda that were documented during three fieldwork trips between one and eight months in duration between 2007 and 2012. During these trips, I
conducted-with help from research assistants fluent in Kinyarwanda-life history and thematic interviews with more than seventy Rwandans, including government officials, survivors, returnees, ex-combatants, convicted génocidaires, and bystanders. 2 This fieldwork revealed the presence of common iconic stories among Rwandans from a range of regional, economic, and political backgrounds, revealing much about the dynamics surrounding collective memory and history in the aftermath of the genocide. I argue that while these iconic stories are important in their own right for revealing the ongoing political and ethnic tensions in post-genocide Rwanda, researchers must analyze them carefully within this wider context to avoid unwittingly reproducing reprehensible political agendas or negatively contributing to a political climate in which collective memory is conflated with identity and power, restricting public discourse to those narratives that aim to legitimize the current government (Ricouer, 2004; Ryan, 2010) . However, more careful analysis recognizes the RPF to be a source of instability in the region. Several human rights organizations and experts have produced damaging reports detailing the lack of civil liberties and democratic reforms in Rwanda. The Kagame regime is criticized for muzzling genuine political opposition, tampering with election results, limiting freedom of expression and freedom of the press, harassing, torturing, and assassinating suspected political dissidents, and waging a proxy war in the DRC.
Approaching post-genocide Rwanda
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Rwandans who speak out against the RPF's human rights abuses risk government harassment, illegal detention and imprisonment, and in extreme cases, assassination, resulting in a growing political opposition in exile. As a result, Rwanda's political climate is tense and many civilians justifiably fear their government.
This climate has led several scholars to approach post-genocide Rwanda as a highly politicized setting, wherein the government 'exerts significant control over sociopolitical discourses and seeks to control what people can say about the government and its policies' (Burnet, 2012 , Jessee, 2011 , Longman, 2011 , Pottier, 2002 , Thomson, 2010 . The RPF, much like previous regimes, has established an official history that is disseminated to the public through an ambitious program of nationalized commemoration, school curricula and the media (Burnet, 2012; Desrosiers and Thomson, 2011) . Rwandans who express their disapproval in public settings run the risk of being labeled political subversives, genocide deniers or terrorists resulting in political and/or legal persecution (Longman, 2011; Republic of Rwanda, 2008 Purdeková, 2011 to mention as part of their translation if they felt a particular story being recounted by a participant was inaccurate or perhaps being recast in a problematic manner so I could make note of this and discuss it at a later point. Likewise, by conducting multiple interviews with each participant, I had ample opportunities to ask their perspectives on the narratives I was encountering, which allowed me to better understand the political and personal symbolic capital attributed to them. In doing so, I made it clear that my interest in these problematic narratives was not to condemn people for constructing lies, for example, but rather to ensure I provided adequate context so as to avoid unwittingly legitimating a version of events that could prove distressing or promote further tensions among Rwandans. For even if a research assistant or participant found a particular narrative morally reprehensible, I recognized that this did not mean the narrative was not still valuable for revealing what a particular individual held to be psychologically true (Laub, 1992) .
Iconic stories in post-genocide Rwanda
Having established the methodological and ethical foundation underlying this article, I
will now consider four iconic stories commonly narrated by Rwandans that are particularly helpful for demonstrating the challenges inherent in narrative analysis in the post-genocide period. The first two iconic stories had great personal resonance for the participants who narrated them, while the third and four iconic stories are more important 11 for their historical resonance. In addition to revealing the everyday political and ethnic tensions that persist in the post-genocide period, these narratives encode subtle resistance to the current official history-'the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi' as it is labeled in official parlance. 12 Taken together, I argue that Rwandans are constantly adapting iconic stories to reflect their individual lived experiences and political agendas, which in turn expose the subtle ethnic and political tensions impacting post-genocide Rwanda.
Iconic story #1: 'I'll never be Tutsi again'
The Kigali Genocide Memorial Center (KGMC) houses a photo exhibit dedicated to children who were murdered during the 1994 genocide. One photograph shows a smiling child whose last words are cited as 'I'll never be Tutsi again'-a stark reminder of the brutality of the genocide and the injustices and indignities inflicted upon unarmed civilians, particularly children. Within the wider context of the exhibit, however, it is damning evidence against the Hutu majority, who are depicted throughout as having been manipulated by Hutu Power extremists into supporting and even directly participating in the torture, murder, and mutilation of their Tutsi compatriots.
13
During casual conversations and interviews with survivors and returnees, the origins of the words-'I'll never be Tutsi again'-were frequently attributed to the child victims of the genocide in a given area, often the child of a relative or friend. The accompanying story was always shared in a similar context, highlighting two points. First, the child's confusion regarding his or her ethnicity-that being a Tutsi was not something an individual could choose, but rather inherited patrilineally-emphasized the child's
innocence. This in turn emphasized the attackers' vehement hatred of Tutsi-a hatred so irrational that even a child could not be spared. Such violence is taboo in Rwanda, where women and children are described as nyampinga, a term that expresses their innocence and inability to inflict suffering upon others.
Augustin, an elderly survivor who had experienced several periods of ethnic and political violence in his community noted that: 'In our culture, a child is considered an angel because of his innocence. Children were protected not only by their parents, but by every adult around.' Other participants referred to children as treasures that were the pride and responsibility of the whole community, not just their immediate families. In this context, the fact that any Rwandan could kill a child from their community, let alone a child who had no understanding as to why he or she is being killed, is not only evocative, but also stigmatizes those who were involved-shame that is cast upon the Hutu masses in who from the perspective of many had successfully re-enslaved Rwanda's Hutu majority in the post-genocide period.
Iconic story #2: The impaled woman
A second iconic story emerged circulated around the Nyamata memorial, where an estimated 2,500 Tutsi civilians were massacred during the genocide. As part of the tour, memorial guides often accompany visitors into a crypt in the center of the church where they recount the story of a young Tutsi mother. During the massacre, the attackers took her into the church courtyard, along with a handful of other beautiful Tutsi women. The attackers took turns raping these women, all the while talking about how this was the only way they could have sex with Tutsi women and how it proved Tutsi women were not so superior after all. 21 The women were then killed. However, the young mother was subject to a particularly brutal form of execution. Her attackers impaled her vagina and breasts with sharpened sticks, and threw her body-along with that of her child-into the church latrine. Their remains were recovered a few years later when local survivors decided the time had come to give the victims a more respectful burial. Unlike the other victims, however, this particular woman's body allegedly showed no signs of decomposition. For this reason, the local community honors her as a saint whose sexual assault and murder are further evidence of the excessive brutality of the Hutu extremists.
Rwandan survivors from the surrounding community speak often of this woman and others who shared a similar fate in speaking about the genocide. Several survivors described female family members or friends who were killed in a comparable manner, both at Nyamata church and elsewhere in the region. Their preoccupation with this iconic story conveys three messages about the genocide. First, the woman's innocence is paramount. In the context of Rwandan culture, her gender, combined with her status as a mother and her decision to seek refuge at the church, should have afforded her protection.
Survivors always stressed that in previous periods of political and ethnic violence in Rwanda, women and children who sought refuge at churches were spared. Second, the manner in which she was tortured and murdered by the Hutu extremists emphasizes their violently ethnocentric beliefs. This relates to a third important message, whereby survivors frequently argued that the Hutu extremists had internalized a particularly vehement hatred for Tutsi women in particular, because they allegedly used their superior beauty to enslave Hutu men (Malkki, 1995) . Survivors offered this explanation to make sense of why Tutsi women were subject to humiliating, overtly sexual forms of torture and murder during the genocide.
For example, in attempting to make sense of this phenomenon, Venant -another elderly survivor -recalled: Interpersonal conflicts may have been a contributing factor, however. Serafina-a survivor from Nyamata-mentioned that prior to the genocide, the impaled woman had had a bad reputation. She was proud of her exceptional beauty, and had rejected several Hutu suitors specifically because she saw them as inferior and wanted a Tutsi husband.
While this by no means justifies the brutal treatment she endured, Serafina mentioned this aspect of her personality as an explanation for why the woman's attackers singled her out for such a brutal death.
Génocidaires' narratives reinforced the possibility that such extreme violence served a symbolic purpose, as well as a functional one. As indicated above, violence against women is taboo within Rwandan culture. Thus, this particular iconic story and the brutality it relates, while likely familiar, was never mentioned. Only a handful of the génocidaires I interviewed ever admitted to participating in attacks on Tutsi women, though their frequent references to women they had 'rescued' may have been a subtle way of acknowledging the widespread practice of sexual slavery and forced marriage during the genocide (Baines, 2003; Carpenter, 2000; Des Forges, 1999; Sharlach, 2000) .
However, in general conversations about symbolic violence, impalement was occasionally discussed as an appropriate means of killing Tutsi women. Several génocidaires complained that Tutsi women were too proud of their beauty and acted as though they were superior to their Hutu neighbors. For example, Alexandre recalled that during the genocide, participating in the murder of one's Tutsi neighbors gave the attackers free reign to use their victims' women ' as tools'-a powerful incentive for rural men who had grown up believing that Tutsi women were unavailable to them because of their superiority. A woman génocidaire, Egidie, expanded on this by noting that rape, as well as the various forms of gender-based violence that accompanied it, such as breast oblation, impalement, and leaving victims' bodies naked in the streets, was a means of giving Tutsi women the dishonorable deaths they deserved. Still other génocidaires expressed mystification about Tutsi women, noting that they were rumoured to have physiologically differences that made them better sexual partners than Hutu women, making them a commodity that only elite Hutu men could afford. Michel-a salesman who committed a range of atrocities during the genocide-noted he and many of the men with whom he attacked had a 'curiosity' about Tutsi women, having grown up hearing stories about how they were better sexual partners. In this context, génocidaires argued that rape, impalement, and other forms of gender-based violence were often framed as an appropriate means of showing Tutsi women that they were no better than their Hutu compatriots.
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Iconic story #3: The evil monarch
The current official history champions Rwanda's pre-colonial period as a utopian era when all Rwandans were united by a monarchy. For example, among its many symbolically potent features, the KGMC hosts a 'Garden of Unity' that, according to the 2011 audio tour, represented the 'Rwanda of ancient times, when the country was united and at peace.' Elsewhere in the exhibit and in other Rwandan cultural and historical institutions, such as the Ethnographic Museum in Huye (Butare), this peace is attributed to the strong, egalitarian leadership of the Rwandan monarchy, which is generally depicted as unanimously loved by the people, including those neighboring territories and communities that Rwanda sought to absorb into its borders to increase its regional power. 23 The policies of the German and Belgian colonizers are held solely responsible for the ethnic and political tensions that would later divide Rwandans according to ethnicity, and little attention is paid to the regional, political, socio-economic and clan divisions that existed previously.
Throughout its history, Rwanda's monarchy was a predominantly Tutsi institution. Kings came from the Abanyiginya clan and mostly married women from the matridynastic Abega, Abaha and Abakono clans to ensure stable political alliances between those families that exercised the greatest political influence and regional power (Mukarutabana, 2012) . While all clans included Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, the matridynastic clans were separate from the three clans associated with the Hutu majority-the Abazibaga, Abagesera, and Abasinga -whose members engaged in direct contact with the earth for ritual and subsistence purposes without risking pollution (Newbury, 2009; Taylor, 1992 ).
Yet despite the potential for inter-ethnic collaboration, collective memory within Rwanda recalls the monarchy as a fundamentally Tutsi institution. Furthermore, in discussing the monarchy, Rwandans often reference 'the king' as though the institution had been ruled by only one leader, rather than the countless kings, court officials, and political intimates who had exercised power over the centuries (Jessee and Watkins, 2014 But in addition to examples of everyday structural violence endured by Hutu in the precolonial and colonial periods, Michel was particularly enthusiastic in discussing the abuses of the Tutsi king, specifically. He described how the Tutsi king used to execute
Hutu men who displeased him and hang their testicles on the royal drum Karinga, which in combination with the annual cycle of rituals performed by the court ritualists, formed the symbolic basis of monarchical legitimacy (Newbury, 1991 emerging from his affiliation with the Hutu Power movement, which condemned Tutsi women for using their superior beauty, intelligence and good manners to trick Hutu men into servitude (Malkki, 1995) . It may also have been informed by his knowledge of Kanjogera, a notorious Queen Mother who orchestrated the suicide of her adopted son King Rutarindwa during the coup of Rucunshu in 1896, and then proceeded to massacre anyone who opposed her, to make her son, Musinga, king (Des Forges, 2011 , Newbury, 1988 .
Iconic stories about to the evil Tutsi monarch were repeated by génocidaires across Rwanda to explain their participation in the genocide and demonstrate the need for Hutu resistance. These iconic stories about the king's systemic abuses of power were grounded in claims regarding the systemic dehumanization of the Hutu prior to the colonial period.
However, génocidaires often described the RPF and its treatment of the Hutu majority as a modern incarnation of the Tutsi monarchy. They wrongly claimed that Kagame was descended from the Abanyiginya clan, which they cited as evidence that Rwanda was in the grips of a new incarnation of the Tutsi monarchy. 25 Such sentiments were influenced by personal experiences of mass atrocities perpetrated by RPF troops and the education that many génocidaires had received under the Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes, as well as the narratives that were transmitted within their families. For these reasons, I began to interpret Locatelli's story as a warning to foreigners like myself that despite our international status, we too were vulnerable to government persecution-a warning that has proved prescient over the years as more and more foreign researchers have found themselves unwelcome in Rwanda. 29 Perhaps this explained why so many participants repeated Locatelli's story in my presence. She had sought to delegitimize the Habyarimana regime at a time when it enjoyed a high degree of international approval, and had been silenced for her efforts, just like many of Kagame's critics since his official rise to office in 2000 (Desrosiers and Thomson, 2011) .
Thus, I must consider the possibility that Locatelli's story was also intended to communicate the necessity of balancing caution and silence on politically sensitive topics in the post-genocide period, for foreign researchers and Rwandans alike. Taken together, the process of analyzing these iconic stories reveals much about the tensions being negotiated by Rwandans in their everyday, post-genocide lives. But something is potentially lost in this analysis as well: namely, the democratizing potential of oral historical practice. By contextualizing these iconic stories in relation to the wider personal, social, economic, and political climates in which they are being reproduced, the researcher risks overwhelming these iconic stories with analysis, obscuring the narrator's intended purpose. This concern does not change the fact that such contextualization and analysis is a necessity in post-genocide Rwanda where it is difficult for ordinary
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Rwandans to speak about their experiences of the genocide and related mass atrocities, as well as Rwandan history, more generally, in a manner that might contradict the RPF's official history, given the authorities' tendency to interpret such acts as an attempt to delegitimize the current regime.
However, analysis of iconic stories like those discussed above can over time create space for public discussion of lived experiences that are impossible to voice in post-genocide Rwanda by maintaining the privacy and confidentiality of the participants. In this sense, the democratizing potential of oral history is being maintained to some extent precisely because it allows for a multiplicity of voices in a setting where such opportunities are typically few and far between. As argued by Erin Baines and Beth Stewart (2011) (1999) . 4 Controversy has emerged over which parties to the conflict are responsible for
Habyarimana's assassination. Soon after Habyarimana's death, a Belgian journalist reported that two French soldiers were responsible for the assassination, while Etienne Sengegera, the Rwandan ambassador to the DRC alleged that Belgian peacekeepers were to blame (Prunier, 1997: 213-214 (Schofield, 2012) . To this end, Andrè Guichaoua, a sociologist and former expert witness for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), has concluded based on evidence collected and verified by ICTR prosecutors that the RPF was most likely responsible for Habyarimana's assassination (Guichaoua, 2015: 144-145) . 5 The number of victims of the genocide is similarly controversial, with conservative estimates by the international community maintaining that between 400,000 and 800,000
Rwandan civilians died, and generous estimates promoted by the RPF arguing that over one million Tutsi died. This paper uses the moderate estimate suggested by Alison Des Forges (1999: 15-16 ).
resulted in a host of pro-RPF reports and articles that were largely uncritical of the human rights abuses perpetrated by RPA soldiers in their efforts to take control of the nation. Filip Reyntjens (2015 Reyntjens ( , 2006 Reyntjens ( , 2004 , Susan Thomson (2011a; (Gahiji, 2014; Kagire, 2014; UN Security Council, 2014) . 13 In fact, the lived realities of Hutu civilians surrounding the genocide were far more complex. There is a plethora of literature detailing the RPF-perpetrated mass atrocities endured by Hutu civilians, beginning with the RPA invasion of northern Rwanda in 1990 and extending into the post-genocide period (Des Forges, 1999; Umutesi, 2004; UN, 2010) . Likewise, there is ample evidence to suggest that Hutu civilians' actions surrounding the genocide was more varied that acknowledged by the current official narrative (Conway, 2011; Jefremovas, 1995; Jessee, 2015; Waldorf, 2009 ).
14 During the genocide, it was common practice in some communities for the Hutu Power extremists to separate Tutsi women, children and the elderly-those who were physically weak-and give them to Hutu women and children to kill (Des Forges, 1999) . This practice ensured widespread complicity in the massacres. research assistants' confidentiality. In addition, I refrain from including personally identifying information about my participants. 20 Conversely, the RPF claims their invasion was motivated by their determination to force the Habyarimana regime into a power-sharing agreement that would end the system of anti-Tutsi discrimination and oppression, and permit Tutsi refugees of previous periods of ethnic and political violence to return to Rwanda. 21 Several scholars have noted the prevalence of an inferiority complex internalized by Hutu men and women, which during the genocide resulted in Tutsi women being subject to particularly brutal forms of torture and murder intended to 'diminish' them. This inferiority complex is rooted in the 'Hamitic hypothesis' made popular in Rwanda during the colonial period, which celebrated the Tutsi's alleged Caucasian heritage as descendants of the biblical figure Ham, and granted them disproportionate access to educational opportunities and power on the grounds they were more intelligent, wellmannered and attractive than their Hutu and Twa compatriots (Baines, 2003 , Des Forges, 1999 , Taylor, 2001 . 22 Christopher Taylor (2001) and Liisa Malkki (1995) 
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24 Catharine Newbury has argued that ubuhake, which could occur between any Rwandan patron and a client regardless of ethnicity, was actually far less divisive than the more widespread practice of uburetwa, a form of corvée labour whereby Hutu civilians worked, paid taxes, and gave a portion of their crops to a Tutsi landholder in exchange for access to land (Newbury, 1980: 100; see also Vansina, 2004: 134) . 25 Paul Kagame is actually descended from the Abakagera lineage of the Abega clan, which as a matridynastic clan, still connotes elite status in Rwandan society. 26 Much like the RPF, Kayibanda and Habyarimana engaged in historical revisionism during their rule. However, the official narratives under Kayibanda and Habyarimana demonized the Tutsi as a means of distracting the Rwandan people from the corruption and mismanagement that characterized their tenure (Newbury, 2002) . 27 The term muzungu (pl. bazungu) is used widely used across Eastern Africa in reference to all foreigners, regardless of ethnicity.
28 Marie-Eve Desrosiers and Susan Thomson (2011: 430) 
